THE NATIONAL INTEREST
A VALID CONCEPT Let me comment first on that phrase, "the national interest."
Only a few years ago the economic interpretation of virtually everything was in vogue. Writers of considerable repute were fobbing off the significance of the national interest as a factor in foreign policy, interpreting it as merely a facade to conceal special interests and to deceive the public.
The return of the phrase to respectable parlance, indicating the recognition of a valid national interest paramount over particular interests, is a gain for straight thinking.
Often a decision in foreign policy is inseparable from the question of the domestic consequences of the decision. It is necessary in such an instance to recognize that our national destiny in a world of many nations is more important than the domestic group interests affected by the decision. In settling questions of conflict between the necessities of national security and group interests, the idea of national interest is valid and essential.
The phrase, moreover, indicates a step away from the utopianism beclouding too much the discussion of international affairs in the sequel to both World War I and World War II.
Nations do have interests. In some instances their interests coincide with the interests of other nations. Sometimes interests of different nations har-84 monize without coinciding. Sometimes they differ, but not incompatibly. Sometimes they are mutually exclusive. Out of these variations comes the real nature of international life. It is useless to try to ignore this by talk about global harmony and the universal state. Such talk, while edifying to those who like it, only hinders-it does not helpthe handling of world problems.
So it is good to hear people talk about international problems again in terms of national interests rather than in the abstractions of world government and world law.
Indeed, it would be a blessed thing if all differences among nations could be translated into differences of interest alone and not differences of basic purpose and principle. It is unselfish to compromise on interests. It is unseemly to compromise on one's principles.
Here I myself stray off into utopianism of another sort. The world is nowhere near that stage of adjustment where all national differences can be dealt with as solely differences of interest, and the coming of that day is too remote for prediction.
WEAKNESSES OF NATIONAL
INTEREST IDEA I have said enough in praise of the idea of national interest; now let me say some things in criticism.
The usefulness and significance of the phrase are limited. It begs more questions than it answers.
In appraising the significance of the national interest, I must distinguish between instances in which the decision turns on weighing our world position as a nation against the claims of particu- Beyond that, I believe the concept of national interest is inadequate and misleading even as a broad concept on which to found a policy. It seems to me that a more appropriate guiding principle is the idea of responsibility. This is a very different sort of idea. I want to devote the rest of this article to the contrast between national interest and responsibility and to examination of the idea of responsibility as it enlightens our present problems.
First I want to discuss our special role in the world today.
APPROACHES TO WORLD PROBLEMS
The great political issues of our time revolve around rival approaches to the handling of the problems growing out of such circumstances peculiar to modern times as the massing of peoplestheir expanded numbers and their in- 
POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION
In so far as the issue has crystallized among nations, however, the Soviet Union stands clearly as the champion of the first approach.
Internal political circumstances cast the Soviet Union in that role. It is ruled by tyrants, who reached the seat of power through conspiracy and, having achieved power, have not dared to risk their hold on it by resort to a valid procedure of consent. They have remained conspirators after becoming governors, combining the usages of conspiracy with the prerogatives of the state. Both at home and in the world at large, the conspiracy that walks like a state requires tension and conflict to maintain its grip. In the service of this purpose it employs a doctrine emphasizing the patterns of conflict-class war, subversion, and the like. This rule is established over a great range, commanding great resources in people and materials. Huge military forces at its disposal are deployed in positions bearing on northern and central Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, southeastern Asia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. The Soviet Union has auxiliaries in the form of embryonic governments under the guise of domestic political groups in territories beyond its imperium. The Soviet power is such that no combination of nations adequate to cope with it is conceivable without the support and participation of the United States. The first is the perfection of our Union, the concept of a nation with steadily growing public values.
Second comes the idea of justice-of power subjected to standards superior to the mere attainment of the ends of power.
Third in the enumeration is domestic tranquillity, conveying the idea of a nation at peace with itself, a nation where issues can be decided by reason, by discussion, by compromise.
Then we come to the common de-fense-the protection of the nation from penetration from the outside. The idea of the general welfare is another of the values set forth. It embodies the idea of a government which serves and is not master, which is accountable to all of its people as contrasted to a government which serves the exclusive interest of a dominant group.
Finally we have the blessings of liberty-the situation in which each person can make choices for himself regarding his life, the life of his children, his religion, and his thoughts.
The fundamental and enduring purpose of our foreign policy is to main- So great an accession of responsibility in so brief a span has placed great moral tests on this nation.
One difficulty arises from the sense, as expressed recently by former Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago, that "this country has been thrust against its will into a position of world leadership." True, no referendum on the issue whether or not to be a nation of such wide responsibilities was ever held. The choice was made unconsciously in many decisions of our past. We were thrust ahead not against but by our wills. The choice is none the less binding for having been made in unawareness of the consequences.
Here we have a paradox-an accession to great power accompanied by a sense of deprivation of freedom.
RESPONSIBILITY WITH LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS
We feel that paradox in another way.
In our historic past we viewed our role as that of standing normally aloof from the power balance whose benefits we enjoyed. At most, we would entertain the idea of throwing in our weight only momentarily to re-establish the balance whenever it might break down in general war. We regarded our role as like that of a pedestrian who might choose to vary his solitary walks by intermittently riding with others, without foreclosing himself from choosing to walk alone again.
Now that is changed. Our power makes our interposition essential to the preservation of the causes with which our interests lie. We must go along with others if we are to keep others with whom to go along. Our power is the basis of our essentiality, and our essentiality compels us to replace our historic sense of freedom by a new consciousness of responsibility.
While losing a sense of freedom, we lose also a sense of effectiveness. In the era when we stood normally aloof from the balance of power, our decision to become a world factor for a season had drastic and immediate results in redressing the balance. Now, by having become permanently involved in preserving the balance, we are no longer vouchsafed the opportunity to alter the situation dramatically and radically by sudden action.
This leaves for us the exacting course of seeking a solution in the long pull through persistent effort to make the best of the situation stage by stage in the knowledge that such is the only way of making the situation better.
OUR POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
Let us look for a moment at the foreign policy which this situation imposes.
It gives us no promise of arrival at some calculable moment at which we can say that all our troubles are behind us, that everything henceforth will be tidy and easy, and that we have crossed the one last river.
I said this to a group of Texans with whom I was discussing our national policy recently. One of them asked me whether I actually thought coexistence with the Soviet Union was possible. That is a curious question. It makes a matter of speculation out of something known to be true. Coexistence with the Soviet Union is not simply possible; it is a fact. Coexistence with a great power that tries to lead a double life as state and as conspiracy is vexatious, certainly, but it is preferable to the tragedy of general war and its sequel, whichever side might win. Our policy seeks to avoid the tragedy of war, to abate the difficulties of coexistence by correcting the circumstances affording special advantage to the adversary, and to work with other nations as best we can to guide international life toward the patterns of conduct preferable to us. This policy, often called the policy of containment, is sometimes criticized as if it aimed for a protracted, static confrontationa sort of perpetually frozen status quo. Such perpetual equilibrium is foreign to the processes of history. The policy is based upon no assumption of arresting change. It rests rather upon the assumption that the factors of position, population, talents, resources, and moral values redound to the ultimate advantage of the side of our interests, and that in the long pull it will be the adversary who must adjust his purposes. This is not a foregone conclusion.
What we and our friends do will be an essential factor in determining the outcome. This is no cause for disquiet. History presents no foregone conclusions. I know of no way to formulate a policy that will absolve us from the subsequent necessity of exercising resolution and restraint and paying the costs, whatever they may be.
How THE POLICY WORKS
The policy works along three general lines.
The first is to make coexistence more tolerable. This calls for improving our armed strength and that of the nations standing with us and combining them more effectively through a system of alliances; for helping the depleted and The policy based on the principle o responsibility lacks the crisp appeal o a phrase like "the national interest."
It involves this paradox-that we ca serve our national interest in these times only by a policy which transcends our national interest. This is the meaning of responsibility. Thinking of beautiful things we know; Dreaming of deeds that we mean to do, All complete, in a minute or twoSomething noble, and grand and good,
Won by merely wishing we could.
I recall the words opening one of Christina Rossetti's poems: Does the road lead uphill all the way? Yes, to the very end.
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